essentially in the will refusing to submit itself to the moral law of God. Let us now suppose that the will of a responsible being has set itself free from the restraints of the moral law. Let us suppose that man is such a being—we say *suppose*, for at present we assume it, leaving the proof till afterwards. We are now to shew that this perverted and rebellious will may come to exercise a reflex influence for evil upon the decisions of the conscience.

It is not difficult to explain this phenomenon of the influence of the will upon the other faculties of the mind. Dr. Brown has some ingenious speculations on this subject. "That it is of the very nature of emotions to render more vivid all the mental affections with which they are peculiarly combined, as if their own vivacity were in some measure divided with these, every one who has felt any strong emotion must have experienced. The eye has, as it were, a double quickness to perceive what we love or hate—what we hope or fear. Other objects may be seen slightly; but these, if seen at all, become instantly permanent, and cannot appear to us without impressing their presence in stronger feeling on our senses and on our soul/'* He then shews how this vividness, producing a permanence of the emotion, influences, in a powerful manner, the whole train of association. We are not quite sure, however, that this is an adequate explanation of the phenomena. The emotional nature of any state of mind must of course produce liveliness ; and this liveliness may, according to some law of the human mind, have an influence upon that state of mind. But it is not to be forgotten that the liveliness is one thing, and the permanence another thing, though Dr. Brown seems to slide unconsciously from the one to the other. The permanence of a thought, accompanied with will, arises, we maintain, from the direct power of the will retaining the thought.

We are quite aware that the will cannot

directly call up any absent idea, or any idea not immediately before the mind. To will a given recollection into existence, is already to be in possession of that recollection. But the mind, while yet without the precise recollection, may know that there is a recollection which it is desirable to recall. If we have forgot, for example, the name of an individual, whose person and character we distinctly remember, we cannot by the direct power of the will